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1. Introduction 
 
 Communal grazing lands are important sources of livestock feed in developing 
countries (ILRI, 1998). In the presence of sufficient demand for livestock or livestock 
products, unrestricted access to the grazing lands will result in overexploitation of the 
resource and the scarcity rent of the resource remains unappropriated. Each individual 
user of the resource enjoys the full benefit of her use of the resource but bears only a 
fractional part of the cost. As a result, the traditional uncontrolled and free grazing system 
in many developing countries has caused severe degradation of the grazing lands.  
Alternative solutions have been proposed to solve this problem including 
privatisation, imposition and enforcement of use rules by external forces such as the 
government, or state ownership of the resource (Wade, 1986). It is unlikely that natural 
resource problems can be solved by private or state property alone. The market system 
backed by public interventions which themselves are based on market incentives are 
likely to succeed in solving resource degradation problems (Pearce and Turner, 1990). 
The transaction cost of enforcing use rules imposed on the community by an external 
force is likely to be prohibitively high due to the high incentives of individual users to 
shirk or the community members to collude against the use rules.  
In the presence of collective action, institutional and organisational development, 
and the development of infrastructure, population pressure is more likely to have a 
positive impact on natural resources than in the absence of these developments (Pender, 
1999).  The success of public policies to improve natural resource management depends 
to a large extent on the presence and effectiveness of local level institutions and 
organisations (Rasmussen and Meinzen-dick, 1995). 
Community natural resource management is increasingly recognised as a viable 
alternative to privatisation or state ownership of the resource. As a result, local level 
resource management institutions and organisations to enforce them are receiving greater 
attention (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995).  
However, devolving rights to local communities to manage resources, establish 
use rules and regulations, and the mechanisms to enforce the rules is only a necessary 
condition for successful  community resource management.  Sustainable resource 
management requires that community rules and regulations be effectively observed 
(Swallow and Bromely, 1995; Turner et al., 1994). Hence, identification of the factors 
that favour or retard from the development and effectiveness of local organisations 
becomes important.   
Although livestock contribute to land degradation, allegations against them tend 
to be exaggerated or even unfounded (Ehui et al., 1998). The underlying causes of land 
degradation may be incomplete property right systems including tenure insecurity, and 
perverse financial incentives rather than increasing livestock numbers or grazing land. 
With appropriate livestock development policies and public interventions in technology 
transfer, livestock have the potential to contribute significantly to the development of 
sustainable and environment friendly mixed crop-livestock systems.  
Ethiopia has the largest livestock population in Africa and stands 10th in the 
world. The livestock sub-sector is an important and integral component of the agricultural 
sector supplying draught power for cultivation, food and income to households, and 
insurance against risk. However, the contribution of the sub-sector to the country's 
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economy remains far below its potential due to feed, disease and management problems. 
Communal grazing lands have been important sources of livestock forage in the country. 
Recently, however, several communal grazing lands have been severely degraded due to 
the free and uncontrolled grazing system.  
The degradation of grazing lands is especially severe in the northern Ethiopian 
region of Tigray. Cognisant of this problem, the improvement of animal feed production 
has become one major component in the regional  livestock development strategy (Fitsum 
et al., 1998). In addition to efforts to increase the number of feed trial and seed 
multiplication sites, and the number of farmers who would benefit from forage seed 
distribution, communities have been empowered to develop and enforce use regulations 
of communal grazing lands. However, there is a paucity of evidence regarding the nature 
of local level institutions and organisations for grazing land management in Tigray, or 
their effectiveness. More generally, there is inadequate empirical evidence for developing 
countries regarding the effectiveness of community institutions to manage and regulate 
use of grazing land, in spite of the increasing attention in the literature to the potential 
contribution of community resource management in recent years.    
This paper attempts to contribute to this gap of knowledge for developing 
countries. The paper has two interrelated objectives. First, it evaluates the nature of 
community grazing land management in Tigray and its impact on the sustainable use of 
grazing lands. Second, it analyses, using multivariate econometric methods, the factors 
influencing collective action and its effectiveness in managing grazing lands. 
 
2. The Setting 
 
The study area, Tigray, is the northern most region of Ethiopia located on the 
Sudano-Sahelian dry lands zone (Warren and Khogali, 1992). It covers an approximate 
area of 80, 000 sq. km with an average  population density of about 40 per sq. km, and 
population growth rate of about 3%. Most of the area is arid or semiarid with annual 
precipitation of 450 to 980 mm.  Most of the rain falls within the months of June, July 
and August exhibiting high intensity, and high temporal and spatial variability (Berhanu 
Gebremedhin, 1998). More than 85% of the regional population lives in the rural areas 
and depends on mixed crop-livestock subsistence agriculture.   
Since 1991 the Ethiopian government has been following an economic 
development strategy known as  Agricultural Development-Led Industrialisation (ADLI) 
which places greater emphasis on agricultural development. Regional administrations 
have been able to draw economic development strategies specific to their conditions 
within the framework of the ADLI. The Tigray region has embarked on resource 
conservation-based ADLI, focusing on conservation and development of soil and water 
resources, environmental rehabilitation through area enclosures and tree plantation and 
the development of small scale irrigation systems. An integral part of the resource 
conservation and development effort has been popular participation of local communities 
(Berhanu Gebremedhin, et al., 2000).  
According to the 1998 livestock census, the region has about 3.04 million cattle, 
0.94 million sheep, 1.47 million goats, 0.41 million equines, and 0.013 million camels 
(BoANRD, 1999). Livestock play an important role in the rural economy of Tigray. They 
are sources of draught power for traction and transportation, cash income from sale of 
livestock and livestock products, food such as milk for household consumption and 
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manure to maintain soil fertility. The primary purpose of livestock production in the crop-
livestock mixed farming systems of the region is draught power production.  
The contribution of the livestock sub-sector to the regional economy has been 
constrained primarily by lack of adequate and quality feed, and livestock diseases.  For 
instance, the annual financial loss due to inadequate feed and management problems is 
estimated to reach as high as 46.9 million Birr1for beef production and 230.9 million Birr 
for milk production (Desta Hagos, 1997).  
The major livestock feed sources in the region include crop residues (45%), 
natural grass (35%), browse (10 %) and crop aftermath (8%) derived from 3.2 million ha 
of grazing land, and 3.6 ha of cultivated land (BOANRD, 1997; UNECA, 1997). Crop 
residues consist of straw, stalk, stovers, sheath and chaffers. About 68% of the crop 
residue is fed to oxen, 20% to milking cows and newly castrated bulls while the 
remaining balance is fed to other livestock during critical periods (UNECA, 1997). 
Prickly pear is also increasingly being used as animal feed, mainly in the southern and 
eastern zones of the region. The spineless cactus is chopped and given to animals while 
the spiny cactus is treated for spine removal with fire and knives. Considering the total 
number of livestock and the contributions of different sources of feed, the grazing lands 
in Tigray are supporting livestock far beyond their carrying capacity (BOANRD, 1997; 
UNECA, 1997; Gebrekidan Teklu, 1994).  
The livestock feeding system in the region shows slight difference by altitude 
(Tsigeweyni Tekleab, 1997). In the highlands, livestock feed mostly on weeds, and green 
grass from farm strips and bunds from July to September. From October to December, 
the dominant feed sources are crop aftermath and range lands. From January to June, crop 
residues, hay, and cactus in some places especially in the eastern and southern zones, are  
the primary source of feed. In this altitude zone, the critical feed shortage is observed in 
the period from July to September, while limited feed shortage is observed during April 
to June. The period from October to March is the period of relatively adequate feed.     
In the lowlands, fallow land and crop aftermath are the major source of feed from 
July to January for farmers with small herd size (livestock reared around homesteads), 
while crop residues and hay constitute the major source from February to April. While 
adequate feed appears to be available during July - April, May to June is the critical feed 
shortage period for these farmers. For farmers with large herd size (livestock reared on 
range lands), natural grazing land is the major source of feed from July to March.  While 
adequate feed appears to exist for the period July to January for these farmers, February 
to March is characterised by limited feed availability, and April to June is the critical feed 
shortage period. 
In the highlands of Tigray, grazing systems show slight difference based on 
season. During the rainy season, when most arable lands are under crops, livestock are 
confined to graze on valley bottoms, farm strips and steep hill sides (Tsigeweyni Tekleab, 
1997). The grazing animals cause significant soil disturbance by trampling on the 
hillsides during the wet season thus contributing to soil erosion. During the dry season, 
arable lands become grazing areas.   
                                                          
1
 In 1998, USD 1 = 7 Birr. 
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Free and uncontrolled grazing is the dominant grazing system in the region. In 
most parts of the region, grazing lands are common property resources2. Most of the 
grazing lands are grazed and trampled the whole year round without any resting period, 
resulting in depletion of the palatable species and invasion by less palatable or 
unpalatable ones. Moreover, grazing on crop land contributes to soil compaction and the 
need for frequent tillage to prepare fields for crops, making practices such as reduced 
tillage less feasible. 
In addition to its contribution to the degradation of grazing lands, the grazing 
system has a negative effect on the conservation efforts underway in the region. Physical 
conservation structures such as stone terraces and soil bunds are destroyed by the freely 
roaming livestock. Biological conservation practices such as grass strips and tree 
plantations are also being destroyed or trampled reducing the chance for establishment 
and regeneration.  
Although the consequences of environmental degradation that results due to the 
free grazing system are faced by both owners and non owners of livestock, the free 
grazing system causes externality costs to those who do not own livestock. Fallow lands 
and cultivated lands after harvest are considered as grazing lands without access 
restrictions. Free grazing leaves the lands without vegetation cover thus contributing to 
soil erosion and the decline of soil fertility, decrease in soil organic matter and the 
deterioration of the soil structure. The farmers who own the lands but who own no 
livestock will then be forced to bear the cost of maintaining the fertility of the land by 
applying commercial fertiliser or manure, or face the consequence of lower yields.  
Some rural communities in Tigray also practice reserving grazing areas for dry 
season feed. In the southern zone, reserved grazing areas are mostly grazed by oxen from 
February until the onset of the next rainy season, while in the central zone reserved 
grazing areas are used for hay making or are grazed by the whole livestock herd starting 
from October. However, the reserved grazing areas appear to be mainly the valley 
bottoms thus contributing to the continuous degradation of the hillsides during the rainy 
season.  
In the eastern zone, private ownership of grazing lands is practised. In some 
woredas (districts) of the zone such as Eurob and Hauzen, the privately held grazing 
areas are converted to communal grazing lands after about two months of private grazing, 
while in Saesi Tsaeda Emba, private grazing is practised all year round (Tsigeweyni 
Tekleab, 1997). In some tabias of   Saesi Tsaeda Emba, farmers separate reserved 
grazing lands intended for cows and oxen. While valley bottoms are reserved for oxen, 
marginal grazing lands are reserved for cows.  
Stall feeding of livestock is not practised in rural Tigray. The shift towards stall 
feeding needs to be seen within the overall context of agricultural production in the 
region (Berhanu Gebremedhin, 1998). Stall feeding can increase availability of manure 
and reduce the energy loss of livestock due to walking in search of feed where there is 
usually little. On the other hand, stall feeding requires more labor for watering, housing, 
and breeding. Oxen and pack animals also need the physical exercise required for 
plowing and transporting. Stall feeding may, however, be more feasible in a more 
intensive dairy production close to cities.   
                                                          
2
 Common property resources are defined as those resources which are collectively owned and managed by 
a given community. They are to be contrasted with open access resources that have no defined owner. 
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3. Research Methods  and Hypotheses     
3.1 Methods 
The results are based on data collected from a survey of 50 tabias (the lowest 
administrative unit in Tigray consisting usually of four to five villages) in the highlands3  
of Tigray in the 1998-99 cropping year. Sample tabias were selected using a stratified 
random sampling. Tabias were stratified based on distance from the nearest market town 
and presence of an irrigation project. Two villages were selected randomly from each 
tabia. A semi-structured questionnaire was administered in a group interview with 
community representatives at both the tabia and village levels. Each interview involved 
ten respondents chosen to represent different age groups, villages, primary occupations 
and gender. The survey collected information about changes in agricultural and natural 
resource conditions between 1991 and 1998, and their causes and effects.    
 Descriptive analysis of survey data was used to identify the nature and impact of 
community management on grazing lands, the role of local and external organisations in 
managing them, the institutions that evolved and their enforcement mechanisms. 
Econometric analysis was used to examine the determinants of collective action and its 
effectiveness in managing grazing lands. 
 Effective collective action for resource management requires that the beneficiaries 
prepare and agree on a set of rules of restrained access to the resource; make 
arrangements for financial, labor or other contributions required for the management of 
the resource; and lay out a system of punishment for violations of the use restrictions. 
Thus, the indicators of collective action and effectiveness used in the econometric 
analysis include whether there are restricted grazing areas in a village, whether 
communities established penalties for violations of use restrictions, whether there were 
any violations of the restrictions on use of the restricted grazing areas in 1998, and 
whether the violations were penalised when they occurred. These indicators may be 
considered as indicators of collective action for protecting the grazing lands.  
 The type of regression model to use depends on the nature of the dependent 
variable. We use binary probit models to examine the determinants of whether a village 
has restricted grazing areas, whether penalties were established, whether any violations 
occurred and whether violations were penalised since these are binary variables.  
 
3.2 Hypotheses 
The likelihood of a successful community institutions and organisations for 
resource management depends on a number of factors related to the nature of the resource 
being managed, the location attributes of the resource, the characteristics of the 
community, and the nature and role of external organisations operating in the community 
in relation to the resource (Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995; Wade, 1996). Thus the 
factors used to explain differences in collective action and its effectiveness include 
population density, access to market represented by distance to nearest woreda (district) 
town, agricultural potential represented by zonal dummies, area and age of the restricted 
grazing land, and whether the grazing land was promoted by an external organisation. 
We base our hypotheses regarding the effect of these factors on community 
resource management on the literature on induced innovation theory and collective action 
                                                          
Highlands are defined as those areas which are above 1500 m.a.s.l. 
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in managing common property resources (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985; North, 1990; Olson, 
1965; Berhanu Gebremedhin et al., 2000; Rasmussen and Meizen-Dick, 1995; Baland 
and Platteau, 1996; Wade, 1985; Pender and Schere, 1999; Pender; 1999; Otsuka and 
Place, 1999; Boserup, 1965).  Community resource management is more likely to be 
effective when the resource is of moderate size and more clearly demarcated, due to 
possible economies of scale, ease of detection of rule-breaking "free riders" and higher 
benefits.  Thus we expect that collective action will be higher for medium-sized grazing 
lands than for small or very large ones.   
Low population density may retard from collective action due to the high 
organisational cost of achieving effectiveness. As population density increases, the need 
for improved resource management increases thus raising the benefits from collective 
action, especially if economies of scale or high exclusion costs favor collective over 
private management.  At very high levels of population density, however, the transaction 
cost of enforcing community rules and the incentive for community members to "free 
ride" on the effort of others may be high.  Diseconomies of scale may replace the 
economies of scale of collective action.  In such circumstances, the benefits from private 
management may outweigh the benefits from collective action. This suggests an inverse 
U-shaped relationship between population density and collective action with intermediate 
levels of population density favoring collective action, while low and very high 
population densities retarding from collective action. 
The location attributes of the resource can be represented by market access and 
agricultural potential. The effect of market access on collective action is mixed. While 
better market access may increase the value of the resource and the return from managing 
the resource effectively, thus favoring collective action, better market access may also 
decrease the incentive of members to abide by community rules by increasing the 
opportunity cost of labor or by providing more "exit" options, making enforcement of 
rules more difficult (Pender and Schere, 1999; Baland and Platteau, 1996). The effect of 
agricultural potential is also ambiguous for similar reasons.  
External organisations can favor collective action by providing technical support, 
and complementary inputs provided that this interventions are demand driven. On the 
other hand, external organisations may retard from collective action if their role 
substitutes for collective action (such as by replacing local effort or dictating 
management decisions) or otherwise undermining collective action (such as by increasing 
"exit options" of local community members) (Pender and Schere, 1999).  Communities 
with longer experience of collective resource management may be more likely to enforce 
use regulations effectively than communities with limited experience in collective 
resource management due to possible “learning effect”. Thus age of the grazing area is 
expected to favor effective community resource management. Since almost all restricted 
grazing areas are managed at the village level, we are not able to test the effect of the 
level of management on collective action. 
 
  
4. Results  
 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
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 Grazing areas with some regulations of use (“restricted grazing areas”  ) are 
common in rural communities in the highlands of Tigray.  Almost 90% of villages in the 
highland has one or more restricted grazing areas. The average restricted grazing land 
area per village is 38 ha and the average grazing land area is 10.5 ha (Table 1).  On 
average, each village in the highlands has about four restricted grazing areas. However, 
there is a wide variation in the number and area of restricted grazing lands per village.  
Almost all restricted grazing areas are used exclusively by the village which manages 
them. In addition to grazing livestock other allowed uses of the restricted grazing areas 
include cutting grass for feed or construction, fuel wood collection from dead trees and 
dung collection, and bee keeping. However, cutting trees or shrubs is not allowed. 
  
Table 1.  Characteristics and Allowed Uses of  Restricted Grazing Areas 
(standard errors in parentheses)* 
 
Item 
 
Village 
level 
Grazing area 
level 
Percentage of villages with  restricted grazing lands 89 
(0.021) 
 
Number of restricted grazing lands per village 3.98 
(0.165) 
 
Area of restricted grazing lands (ha) 38.2 
(3.615) 
10.45 
(1.112) 
Percentage of grazing lands promoted by external 
organisations 
  
32 
(0.0349) 
Allowed uses of restricted grazing lands (percent) 
            cutting grass 
 
            fuelwood collection 
 
            collecting dung 
 
            collecting fruits 
 
             beekeeping 
 
             cutting trees 
  
22 
(0.03) 
53 
(0.034) 
90 
(0.021) 
66 
(0.033) 
60 
(0.032) 
0 
(0.0) 
* Means and standard errors are corrected for sampling stratification and weights. 
 
There is a long tradition of developing and enforcing use regulations of grazing 
areas in Tigray. More than 58% of the grazing areas in the surveyed villages were 
established prior to 1966, while only about 17% percent have been established since 
1990. Village administration is the local organisation principally mandated for the 
management of the grazing areas. In a few cases, a group of elders has the management 
responsibility. In addition to the village organisations, tabia administrations and the 
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Bureau of Agriculture are also involved in management of the grazing areas. The role of 
the local and external organisations in the management of the grazing areas include 
organising and informing potential participants, preparing rules and regulations of use 
and enforcement of their implementation, and provision of material and technical 
assistance. The village administrations are principally involved in organising and 
informing beneficiaries, the preparation of rules and  regulations and enforcement of 
implementation, and guard financing. The Bureau of Agriculture is involved mainly in 
the provision of material and technical assistance.  
 The most frequent contribution of village members in management of the grazing 
lands is cash or in kind contribution for guard payment. Other contributions of village 
residents include uncompensated labor contribution for the construction of soil and water 
conservation practices, guarding the area on rotation basis, and fencing and weeding.   
Most grazing areas in the highlands (68%) are not promoted by any organisation 
or program indicating the prevalence of local initiatives for collective action in managing 
grazing lands. In cases where the grazing areas were promoted by an organisation or a 
program, the Bureau of Agriculture took the lead. More than half of the restricted grazing 
areas are used for grazing only by oxen while the remaining are grazed by all animals. 
There is a variation in the period during which the grazing lands are used for grazing. In 
42% of the cases the grazing lands are used from September to December , 29% from 
January to May, and 13% from June to August. Only oxen are allowed to graze from June 
to August. In a few cases, grazing is allowed after the grass is cut.   
 The most common way of protecting the grazing lands is by hiring guards (77%) 
paid by contributions from households in cash or in kind, or in return for benefits from 
using the grazing areas. The most dominant way of compensating guards is payment in 
cash or in kind. When cash payment is used, a guard is paid 40 birr/month on average. In 
some villages only those who own oxen contribute for guard payment. When a guard is 
not hired, village households rotate in guarding the grazing lands or fence the grazing 
land. Mutual trust among villagers is used in a few cases as a way of protecting the areas.  
 Penalties for violations of use restrictions of grazing lands are widely used in the 
highlands of Tigray. In 1998, violations of use restrictions were reported in 26% of the 
grazing lands, of which about 81% were penalized. Farmers do not perceive any 
problems as a result of the use restrictions of the grazing areas in terms of shortage of 
grass, harbouring pests, fire hazard, shortage of fuel wood, or uncertainty about receiving 
benefit from them. Moreover, farmers believe that the use restrictions facilitate a 
significant regeneration of the grazing areas. All restricted areas remained restricted once 
they were established. 
 The most frequent violations of use restrictions of the grazing lands reported in 
1998 were letting animals graze while grazing was not allowed, and cutting grass for feed 
and construction without permission. Other violations include cutting roots, branches, 
leaves or trees, and collecting fuel wood. Communities mostly use penalty in cash for 
violations of letting animals graze and cutting grass and trees when not allowed.  Sixty 
one percent of cash penalties during establishment and 72% of cash penalties in 1998 
were applied to violations of grazing animals and cutting grass and trees. In some cases 
(21% of penalties during establishment and 18% in 1998) the village courts were 
mandated to decide on penalties for violations. Confiscation of the cut grass and trees, 
and the cutting implements were used in few cases.   
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The survey asked about penalties used by communities for violations of use 
restrictions when area was established and in 1998. The nominal value of cash penalties 
has increased in 1998 compared to the time when the restricted grazing areas were 
established. The average cash penalty for grazing animals was 5 Birr/head of livestock or 
35 Birr/violation during establishment, while the corresponding figures in 1998 were 10 
Birr/head of livestock or about 100 Birr/violation. Moreover, the frequency of use of cash 
penalties, and imprisonment increased in 1998, while mandating the village court to 
decide on penalties, penalty in kind and confiscation decreased (Table 2). In a few cases 
penalties were not initially developed when the use restrictions were established while 
penalties were developed for almost all grazing areas in 1998.  
 The most frequently cited benefit received from the grazing lands in 1998 is 
grazing animals while feed is in short supply. On average, 42% of households in each 
village received benefit from grazing animals in 1998. Other benefits to rural households 
in 1998 include cutting grass for feed and other purposes, collecting dung, and collecting 
fuel wood from dead trees. 
 
Table 2: Penalties Established for Violations of Use Restrictions of Restricted 
Grazing Lands (percent of grazing areas) 
 
Type of penalty when restricted grazing land was 
established 
1998 
cash penalty 63.3 69.9 
 
Decided by village court 21.4  18.4 
 
Penalty in kind   3.4   1.4 
 
confiscate the cut grass and trees, and 
implements 
   
  2.7 
   
  1.4 
 
no penalty   6.8   0.5 
 
imprisonment   0.0   1.4 
 
other*   2.4   7.0 
 
* includes cash penalty combined with in kind payment, warning and imprisonment 
 
  
4.2 Econometric Analysis  
 The results of econometric analysis are presented in Table 3. We include 
population density and population density squared to test for an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between population density and collective action. Zonal4 dummies were 
included to account for the differences in agricultural potential (the Southern and Western 
zones have generally higher agricultural potential) and other differences between these 
                                                          
4
 The Tigray region is divided into four zones (Southern, Central, Eastern and western)  
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zones.  Market access is represented by walking time from village to woreda town, which 
is the place farmers mostly use to market their produce and purchase inputs. The effect of 
the presence of an external organisation is examined by including a dummy variable 
Table 3. Determinants of Collective Action and its Effectiveness on Grazing Landsa 
Explanatory 
variable 
Whether a village has 
restricted grazing area 
Whether 
penalties were 
established 
Whether any 
violations of 
restrictions 
occurred in 
1998 
Whether 
violations in 
1998 were 
penalizedb 
Central zone (cf, 
Southern zone) 
 
-2.016*** 
 
0.1543 
 
-1.5463*** 
 
-0.3215 
Eastern zone (cf. 
Southern zone) 
 
-1.473*** 
 
0.3513 
 
-1.3662*** 
 
 
Western zone (cf. 
Southern zone) 
 
-2.586*** 
 
-0.6317 
 
0.85232 
 
1994 population 
density (per sq. 
km.) 
 
-0.0235215** 
 
-0.0188463* 
 
 
-0.01967*** 
 
-0.027345*** 
1994 population 
density squared 
 
0.0000744** 
 
0.0000518 
 
0.0000926*** 
 
0.0000858** 
Distance to 
Woreda town 
(walking time in 
minutes)  
 
 
-0.0001353 
 
 
0.00405*** 
 
 
0.003379*** 
 
 
0.0001157 
Area of restricted 
grazing area (ha) 
  
-0.02859*** 
 
0.000983 
 
-0.0278* 
Grazing area 
promoted by 
external 
organisation 
  
 
0.38774 
 
 
0.41069 
 
 
-0.3504 
Age of restricted 
grazing area 
  
0.006648 
 
0.00538 
 
0.00094 
 
Intercept 
 
3.884*** 
 
2.8658*** 
 
-0.368 
 
2.8179*** 
Type of regression Probit Probit Probit Probit 
a
 All regression results were corrected for sampling stratification and weights, and 
standard errors are robust to hetroskedasticity and non-independence within the primary 
sampling units (tabias). 
b Eastern and Western zones were dropped from these regression as they predicted 
outcomes perfectly. 
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** siginificant at 1% level. 
 
 
for whether the grazing area was promoted by an external organisation. Age of a grazing 
area was measured as the number of years since the use regulations were established. The 
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size of the grazing area was included to examine the presence of economies (or 
diseconomies) of scale.       
 We find that the Western zone is least likely to have restricted grazing areas, 
consistent with the existence of a relatively more abundant grazing land in the zone 
compared to other zones of the region, thus perhaps reducing the need for restricted 
grazing areas. The Central and Eastern zones are also less likely to have restricted 
grazing areas than the Southern zone. That these zones are less likely to have restricted 
grazing lands may indicate that farmers in the zones resort more to other livestock feed 
sources than grazing lands, given the higher severity of land degradation in the zones 
(compared to the Southern zone). However, violations of use restrictions are less likely to 
occur in the Central and Eastern zones suggesting that once restricted grazing areas are 
established, community benefits are higher. The lower likelihood of violations of use 
restrictions in the Eastern zone is also consistent with the tradition of private ownership 
of grazing lands and reserving grazing lands for dry season grazing in the zone. There is 
no statistically significant difference in the likelihood of violations of use restrictions 
between the Southern and Western zones.  
We find a U-shaped relationship between population density and violations of use 
restrictions of grazing lands, consistent with our hypothesised inverted U-shaped 
relationship between population density and collective action. Violations of use 
restrictions are higher at low and very high population densities. This suggests that, once 
restricted grazing lands are established, communities are more likely to observe use rules 
at medium population density than at low and very high densities due to higher collective 
benefits and possible economies of scale in managing the grazing lands.  Consistent with 
this result, we also find a U-shaped relationship between population density and the 
development of penalty system and its enforcement when violations occur.  This suggests 
that the need for a penalty system and its enforcement becomes less when violations are 
fewer, indicating that penalty system and its enforcement are not indicators of collective 
action but indicators of failure of collective action.    
Contrary to our expectations, we find that restricted grazing areas are less likely to 
be established at intermediate population densities than at low and very high densities. 
This result is hard to interpret and suggests for a further investigation on the process that 
communities pass through in establishing restriction rules of grazing lands.  
 We find that more remote areas have higher violations of use restrictions and are 
more likely to develop penalty systems suggesting that lower resource values and benefits 
result in reduced (failure of) collective action. The presence of external organisations 
failed to have significant effect on any of the indicators of collective action, suggesting 
that since most restricted grazing lands were established through the initiatives of local 
communities, the role of external organizations was not important.  
Community experience in managing restricted grazing lands did not have 
significant effect on collective action suggesting that there is no “learning effect” in 
community grazing land management in the region. Penalties are less likely to be 
developed and enforced for wider grazing areas. It may be that the difficulty of detection 
of violators undermines the need for penalty system. Area of grazing land explained 
occurrence of violations of use restrictions positively but was insignificant.  In the 
regression for whether violations were penalised when they occur, Eastern and Western 
zones were dropped as they predicted outcomes perfectly. 
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5. Conclusions and Implications 
 Rural communities in Tigray have long tradition of developing and enforcing use 
regulations of grazing areas. Village organisations play an active role in managing 
restricted grazing areas by organising and informing beneficiaries, and establishing and 
enforcing use regulations, with technical and material assistance from the Regional 
Bureau of Agriculture. Beneficiaries contribute to grazing land management through cash 
and in kind contribution for protection and uncompensated labor contribution for the 
development of the grazing lands.  
Upon realisation of the benefits from restricted grazing areas, communities 
maintain the use regulations once they are established. Given the crucial role of traction 
for crop production, oxen appear to be the main users of the restricted grazing lands. 
Communities tend to be more likely to develop and enforce penalties when violations of 
use restrictions are more frequent. Restricted grazing areas are least likely to be 
established in areas of relative abundance of livestock feed. We found no evidence of 
“learning effect” in community grazing land management.   
We found some support for the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between population density and collective action, especially through reduced violations 
of use restrictions and reduced need to develop and enforce penalty systems. However we 
also found that population pressure reduces the likelihood of establishment of restricted 
grazing areas.  Market access appears to encourage grazing land management perhaps by 
increasing resource values or returns from use of the resource, especially by encouraging 
community members to observe use restrictions and reducing the need for penalties.  
The findings imply that community grazing land management can contribute to a 
more sustainable use of grazing lands and the alleviation of feed shortage problems. 
Upon realisation of benefits, farmers can contribute to the management of grazing lands 
and be more likely to observe community rules. Community grazing land management 
may be more effective in areas closer to markets facing severe feed shortage.  
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Annex: Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Regressions 
 
Variable No. of 
Observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Eastern zone 263 0.349 0.477 0 1 
Southern zone 263     
Western zone 263 0.061 0.239 0 1 
Central zone 263 0.236 0.427 0 1 
Livestock density (TLU 
per sq. km.) 
 
259 
 
120.84 
 
32.3 
 
57.01 
 
196.12 
1994 population density 
(per sq. km.) 
 
261 
 
132.38 
 
63.43 
 
35.78 
 
302.56 
Whether village has 
restricted grazing area 
 
 
262 
 
 
0.9 
 
 
0.299 
 
 
0 
 
 
11 
Whether village 
established penalties 
 
237 
 
0.958 
 
0.201 
 
0 
 
1 
Whether violations 
occurred 
 
235 
 
0.264 
 
0.442 
 
0 
 
1 
Whether violations were 
penalised 
 
63 
 
0.809 
 
0.396 
 
0 
 
1 
Walking distance from 
village to nearest 
woreda town (minutes) 
 
 
263 
 
 
164.9 
 
 
113.62 
 
 
10 
 
720 
 grazing land  promoted 
by external organisation 
 
237 
 
0.287 
 
0.453 
 
0 
 
1 
Area of grazing land 237 10.45 20.85 .25 200 
Age of grazing land 236 23.56 11.07 0 32 
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